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Report Summary
Public Health
Assessment of
Potential Biological
Terrorism Agents
As part of a Congressional initia-
tive begun in 1999 to upgrade national
public health capabilities for response
to acts of biological terrorism, the
Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) was designated the
lead agency for overall public health
planning. A Bioterrorism Prepared-
ness and Response Office has been
formed to help target several areas for
initial preparedness activities, includ-
ing planning, improved surveillance
and epidemiologic capabilities, rapid
laboratory diagnostics, enhanced com-
munications, and medical therapeu-
tics stockpiling (1). To focus these
preparedness efforts, however, the
biological agents towards which the
efforts should be targeted had to first
be formally identified and placed in
priority order. Many biological agents
can cause illness in humans, but not all
are capable of affecting public health
and medical infrastructures on a large
scale. 
The military has formally assessed
multiple agents for their strategic use-
fulness on the battlefield (2). In addi-
tion, the Working Group on Civilian
Biodefense, using an expert panel con-
sensus-based process, has identified
several biological agents as potential
high-impact agents against civilian
populations (3-7). To guide national
public health bioterrorism prepared-
ness and response efforts, a method
was sought for assessing potential bio-
logical threat agents that would pro-
vide a reviewable, reproducible means
for standardized evaluations of these
threats. 
In June 1999, a meeting of
national experts was convened to 1)
review potential general criteria for
selecting the biological agents that
pose the greatest threats to civilians
and 2) review lists of previously iden-
tified biological threat agents and
apply these criteria to identify which
should be evaluated further and priori-
tized for public health preparedness
efforts. This report outlines the overall
selection and prioritization process
used to determine the biological
agents for public health preparedness
activities. Identifying these priority
agents will help facilitate coordinated
planning efforts among federal agen-
cies, state and local emergency
response and public health agencies,
and the medical community.
Overview of Agent Selection 
and Prioritization Process
On June 3-4, 1999, academic
infectious disease experts, national
public health experts, Department of
Health and Human Services agency
representatives, civilian and military
intelligence experts, and law enforce-
ment officials1 met to review and
comment on the threat potential of
various agents to civilian populations.
The following general areas were used
as criteria: 1) public health impact
based on illness and death; 2) delivery
potential to large populations based on
stability of the agent, ability to mass
produce and distribute a virulent
agent, and potential for person-to-per-
son transmission of the agent; 3) pub-
lic perception as related to public fear
and potential civil disruption; and 4)
special public health preparedness
needs based on stockpile require-
ments, enhanced surveillance, or diag-
nostic needs. Participants reviewed
lists of biological warfare or potential
biological threat agents and selected
those they felt posed the greatest
threat to civilian populations.
The following unclassified docu-
ments containing potential biological
threat agents were reviewed: 1) the
Select Agent Rule list, 2) the Austra-
lian Group List for Biological Agents
for Export Control, 3) the unclassified
military list of biological warfare
agents, 4) the Biological Weapons
Convention list, and 5) the World
Health Organization Biological Weap-
ons list (8-12). Participants with
appropriate clearance levels reviewed
intelligence information regarding
classified suspected biological agent
threats to civilian populations. Geneti-
cally engineered or recombinant bio-
logical agents were considered but not
included for final prioritization
because of the inability to predict the
nature of these agents and thus iden-
tify specific preparedness activities for
public health and medical response to
them. In addition, no information was
available about the likelihood for use
of one biological agent over another.
This aspect, therefore, could not be
considered in the final evaluation of
the potential biological threat agents.
Participants discussed and identi-
fied agents they felt had the potential
1Participants are listed in Acknowledg-
ments.NEWS & NOTES
226 Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 2, February 2002
for high impact based on subjective
assessments in the four general cate-
gories. After the meeting, CDC per-
sonnel then attempted to identify
objective indicators in each category
that could be used to further define
and prioritize the identified high-
impact agents and provide a frame-
work for an objective risk-matrix anal-
ysis process for any potential agent.
The agents were evaluated in each of
the general areas according to the
objective parameters and were charac-
terized by the rating schemes outlined
in the Appendix. Final category
assignments (A, B, or C) of agents for
public health preparedness efforts
were then based on an overall evalua-
tion of the ratings the agents received
in each of the four areas.
Results
Based on the overall criteria and
weighting, agents were placed in one
of three priority categories for initial
public health preparedness efforts: A,
B, or C (Table 1). Agents in Category
A have the greatest potential for
adverse public health impact with
mass casualties, and most require
broad-based public health prepared-
ness efforts (e.g., improved surveil-
lance and laboratory diagnosis and
stockpiling of specific medications).
Category A agents also have a moder-
ate to high potential for large-scale
dissemination or a heightened general
public awareness that could cause
mass public fear and civil disruption.
Most Category B agents also have
some potential for large-scale dissemi-
nation with resultant illness, but gen-
erally cause less illness and death and
therefore would be expected to have
lower medical and public health
impact. These agents also have lower
general public awareness than Cate-
gory A agents and require fewer spe-
cial public health preparedness efforts.
Agents in this category require some
improvement in public health and
medical awareness, surveillance, or
laboratory diagnostic capabilities, but
presented limited additional require-
ments for stockpiled therapeutics
beyond those identified for Category
A agents. Biological agents that have
undergone some development for
widespread dissemination but do not
otherwise meet the criteria for Cate-
gory A, as well as several biological
agents of concern for food and water
safety, are included in this category. 
Biological agents that are cur-
rently not believed to present a high
bioterrorism risk to public health but
which could emerge as future threats
(as scientific understanding of these
agents improves) were placed in Cate-
gory C. These agents will be
addressed nonspecifically through
overall bioterrorism preparedness
efforts to improve the detection of
unexplained illnesses and ongoing
public health infrastructure develop-
ment for detecting and addressing
emerging infectious diseases (13).
Agents were categorized based on
the overall evaluation of the different
areas considered. Table 2 shows the
evaluation schemes as applied to
agents in Categories A and B. For
example, smallpox would rank higher
than brucellosis in the public health
impact criterion because of its higher
untreated mortality (approximately
30% for smallpox and <2% for brucel-
losis); smallpox has a higher dissemi-
nation potential because of its
capability for person-to-person trans-
mission. Smallpox also ranks higher
for special public health preparedness
needs, as additional vaccine must be
manufactured and enhanced surveil-
lance, educational, and diagnostic
efforts must be undertaken. Inhala-
tional anthrax and plague also have
higher public health impact ratings
than brucellosis because of their
higher morbidity and mortality.
Although mass production of Vibrio
cholera (the biological cause of chol-
era) and Shigella  spp. (the cause of
Table 1. Critical biological agent 
categories for public health preparedness
Biological agent(s) Disease
Category A
Variola major Smallpox
Bacillus anthracis Anthrax
Yersinia pestis Plague
Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxins) Botulism
Francisella tularensis Tularemia
Filoviruses and Arenaviruses (e.g., Ebola virus, Lassa virus)V i r a l  
hemorrhagic fevers
Category B
Coxiella burnetii Q fever
Brucella spp. Brucellosis
Burkholderia mallei Glanders
Burkholderia pseudomallei Melioidosis
Alphaviruses (VEE, EEE, WEEa) Encephalitis
Rickettsia prowazekii Typhus fever
Toxins (e.g., Ricin, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B) Toxic syndromes
Chlamydia psittaci Psittacosis
Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella spp., Escherichia coli O157:H7)
Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio cholerae, Cryptosporidium parvum)
Category C
Emerging threat agents (e.g., Nipah virus, hantavirus)
aVenezuelan equine (VEE), eastern equine (EEE), and western equine encephalomyelitis (WEE)  virusesEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 2, February 2002 227
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shigellosis) would be easier than the
mass production of anthrax spores, the
public health impact of widespread
dissemination would be less because
of the lower morbidity and mortality
associated with these agents. Although
the infectious doses of these bacteria
are generally low, the total amount of
bacteria that would be required and
current water purification and food-
processing methods would limit the
effectiveness of intentional large-scale
water or food contamination with
these agents.
Discussion
Although use of conventional
weapons such as explosives or fire-
arms is still considered the most likely
means by which terrorists could harm
civilians (14), multiple recent reports
cite an increasing risk and probability
for the use of biological or chemical
weapons (15-18). Indeed, the use of
biological and chemical agents as
small- and large-scale weapons has
been actively explored by many
nations and terrorist groups (19-20).
Although small-scale bioterrorism
events may actually be more likely in
light of the lesser degrees of complex-
ity to be overcome, public health
agencies must prepare for the still-
possible large-scale incident that
would undoubtedly lead to cata-
strophic public health consequences.
The selection and prioritization of the
potential biological terrorism agents
described in this report were not based
on the likelihood of their use, but on
the probability that their use would
result in an overwhelming adverse
impact on public health. 
Most evaluations of potential risk
agents for biological warfare or terror-
ism have historically been based on
military concerns and criteria for troop
protection. However, several charac-
teristics of civilian populations differ
from those of military populations,
including a wider range of age groups
and health conditions, so that lists of
military biological threats cannot sim-
ply be adopted for civilian use. These
differences and others may greatly
increase the consequences of a biolog-
ical attack on a civilian population.
Civilians may also be more vulnerable
to food- or waterborne terrorism, as
was seen in the intentional Salmonella
contamination of salad bars in The
Dalles, Oregon, in 1984 (21).
Although food and water systems in
the United States are among the safest
in the world, the occurrence of nation-
wide outbreaks due to unintentional
food or water contamination demon-
strates the ongoing need for vigilance
in protecting food and water supplies
(22-23). Overall, many other factors
must be considered in defining and
focusing multiagency efforts to protect
civilian populations against bioterror-
ism. 
Category A agents are being given
the highest priority for preparedness.
For Category B, public health pre-
paredness efforts will focus on identi-
fied deficiencies, such as improving
awareness and enhancing surveillance
or laboratory diagnostic capabilities.
Category C agents will be further
assessed for their potential to threaten
large populations as additional infor-
mation becomes available on the epi-
demiology and pathogenicity of these
agents. In addition, special epidemio-
logic and laboratory surge capacity
will be maintained to assist in the
investigation of naturally occurring
outbreaks due to Category C “emerg-
ing” agents. Linkages established with
established programs for food safety,
emerging infections diseases, and
unexplained illnesses will augment the
overall bioterrorism preparedness
efforts for many Category B and C
agents.
The above categories of agents
should not be considered definitive.
The prioritization of biological agents
for preparedness efforts should con-
tinue. Agents in each category may
Table 2. Criteria and weightinga used to evaluate potential biological threat agents
Disease
Public health 
impact
Dissemination 
potential
Public
perception
Special 
preparation Category Disease Death P-Db P - Pc
Smallpox + ++ + +++ +++ +++ A
Anthrax ++ +++ +++ 0 +++ +++ A
Plagued ++ +++ ++ ++ ++ +++ A
Botulism ++ +++ ++ 0 ++ +++ A
Tularemia ++ ++ ++ 0 + +++ A
VHFe ++ +++ + + +++ ++ A
VEf ++ + + 0 ++ ++ B
Q Fever + + ++ 0 + ++ B
Brucellosis + + ++ 0 + ++ B
Glanders ++ +++ ++ 0 0 ++ B
Melioidosis + + ++ 0 0 ++ B
Psittacosis + + ++ 0 0 + B
Ricin toxin ++ ++ ++ 0 0 ++ B
Typhus + + ++ 0 0 + B
Cholerag + + ++ +/- +++ + B
Shigellosisg ++ + + + + + B
aAgents were ranked from highest threat (+++) to lowest (0).
bPotential for production and dissemination in quantities that would affect a large population, based on availability, 
BSL requirements, most effective route of infection, and environmental stability. 
cPerson-to-person transmissibility.
dPneumonic plague.
eViral hemorrhagic fevers due to Filoviruses (Ebola, Marburg) or Arenaviruses (e.g., Lassa, Machupo).
fViral encephalitis.
gExamples of food- and waterborne diseases.NEWS & NOTES
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change as new information is obtained
or new assessment methods are estab-
lished. Disease elimination and eradi-
cation efforts may result in new agents
being added to the list as populations
lose their natural or vaccine-induced
immunity to these agents. Conversely,
the priority status of certain agents
may be reduced as the identified pub-
lic health and medical deficiencies
related to these agents are addressed
(e.g., once adequate stores of smallpox
vaccine and improved diagnostic
capabilities are established, its rating
within the special preparedness needs
category would be reduced, as would
its overall rating within the risk-matrix
evaluation process). To meet the ever-
changing response and preparedness
challenges presented by bioterrorism,
a standardized and reproducible evalu-
ation process similar to the one out-
lined above will continue to be used to
evaluate and prioritize currently iden-
tified biological critical agents, as well
as new agents that may emerge as
threats to civilian populations or
national security.
Appendix
Risk-Matrix Analysis Process 
Used to Evaluate Potential 
Biological Threat Agents
In the area of public health impact,
disease threat presented by an agent was
assessed by evaluating whether the illness
resulting from exposure could be treated
without hospitalization. In addition, mor-
tality rates for exposed, untreated persons
were considered (24-26). Biological agents
were given a higher rating for morbidity
(++) if illness would most likely require
hospitalization and a lower rating (+) if
outpatient treatment might be possible for
a large part of the affected population.
Agents were also rated highest (+++) for
expected untreated mortality >50%,
medium (++) for mortality of 21% to 49%,
and lowest (+) for an expected mortality
<20%. 
Agents were rated according to their
overall potential for initial dissemination
to a large population (+ to +++) and their
potential for continued propagation by per-
son-to-person transmission (0 to ++).
Overall dissemination potential of an agent
was based on an assessment of 1) the capa-
bility for mass production of the agent
(assessment based on availability of agent
and Biosafety Level (BSL) requirements
for quantity production of an agent), and 2)
their potential for rapid, large-scale dis-
semination (assessment based on the most
effective route of infection and the general
environmental stability of the agent).
Agents were rated (++) if they were
readily obtainable from soil, animal/insect,
or plant sources (most available; e.g., B.
anthracis), (+) if mainly available only
from clinical specimens, clinical laborato-
ries, or regulated commercial culture sup-
pliers (e.g., Shigella spp.), and (0) if
available only from nonenvironmental,
noncommercial, or nonclinical sources
such as high-level security research labo-
ratories (least readily available; e.g., Vari-
ola or Ebola viruses). 
BSL requirements for an agent were
based on recommended levels for working
with large quantities of an agent (27). BSL
ratings were used to estimate the level of
technical expertise and containment facili-
ties that would be required to work with
and mass produce an agent safely. Agents
that required higher BSL levels were given
lower ratings, as they would require
greater technical capabilities and contain-
ment facilities to be produced in large
quantities. Agents were given (+) for BSL
4 production safety requirements, (++) for
BSL 3 requirements, and (+++) for BSL 2
or lower requirements.
Agents were also assessed with regard
to their main routes of infection, with the
assumption that those causing infection via
the respiratory route could be more readily
disseminated to affect large populations.
Agents were assigned (++) if most effec-
tive at causing illness via an aerosol expo-
sure route (air release potential) and (+) if
most effective when given by the oral
route (food/water release potential). Dis-
semination potential should also take into
account the stability of an agent following
its release. Information regarding the
expected general environmental stability
of agents was obtained from multiple
sources (24,28-31). Agents that may
remain viable in the environment for >1
year were given (+++), while agents con-
sidered less environmentally stable were
given (++) (potentially viable for days to
months) or (+) (generally viable for min-
utes to hours). The ratings system for envi-
ronmental stability was assigned to reflect
the wide range of stability of the agents,
while maintaining a simple overall scheme
that contained only a few categories (min-
utes to hours, days to months, >1 year).
The ratings for all the subcategories evalu-
ated for production and dissemination
potential were then totaled and agents
were assigned a final rating for production
and dissemination capability. If the total
rating in the subcategories was >9, the
agent was given (+++); for a total of 7-8,
the agent was given a (++); and for a total
of <6, the agent was given a final rating of
(+) for the overall production and dissemi-
nation capability. 
As potential outbreak propagation
through continued person-to-person trans-
mission would also increase the overall
dissemination capabilities of an agent, they
were evaluated separately for this charac-
teristic. Agents were rated highest if they
had potential for both person-to-person
respiratory and contact spread (+++) and
lower for mainly respiratory (++) or con-
tact spread potential alone (+). Agents
were rated (0) if they presented low or no
transmission risk. 
Agents were also assessed (0 to +++)
according to preexisting heightened pub-
lic awareness and interest, which may con-
tribute to mass public fear or panic in
biological terrorism events. The number of
times an agent or disease appeared in a
selected form of media was used as a sur-
rogate to determine the current level of
public awareness and interest for the agent
or disease. Titles of newspaper articles and
radio and television transcripts from June
1, 1998, to June 1, 1999, in an Internet
database (32) were retrospectively
searched by agent name and disease. This
database contained articles and transcripts
from approximately 233 newspapers and
70 radio or television sources. If a disease
was caused by multiple agents (e.g., viral
hemorrhagic fever), the database was
searched for each of the agents in addition
to the name of the disease. Articles or tran-
scripts were only counted if the name of
the agent, disease, or other general terms
such as bioterrorism, biological terrorism,
terrorism, and weapons of mass destruc-
tion appeared in the title. Multiple hits for
the same title were counted only once
unless they appeared in different newspa-
pers or transcripts. Agents were rated
based on the number of times they
appeared in these forms of media within
the 1-year period. Agents were given (0)Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 2, February 2002 229
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rating for <5 titles, (+) for 5-20 titles, (++)
for 21-45 titles, and (+++) for >45 titles
identified within the search period. 
Requirements for special public health
preparedness were also considered. Higher
ratings were given to agents with different
requirements for special preparedness. An
agent was given a (+) for each special pre-
paredness activity that would be required
to enhance the public health response to
that agent. These distinct preparedness
requirements included 1) stockpiling of
therapeutics to assure treatment of large
numbers of people (+), 2) need for
enhanced public health surveillance and
education (+), and 3) augmentation of
rapid laboratory diagnostic capabilities
(+). Therefore, if all three special pre-
paredness efforts would be required to pro-
vide a strong public health response for
that agent, it was given (+++) for this cate-
gory. Agents that did not require all special
preparedness efforts were given lower rat-
ings (++ or +).
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